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DIRECT DEMOCRACY
AND STATE FISCAL CRISES:
THE PROBLEM OF TOO MUCH LAW
PETER CONTI-BROWN*
The recent debate concerning state fiscal crises has appropriately
focused on the question of money: that is, the money states have
committed to their employees, bondholders, and citizens, and the
1
implications of economic recession for those promises to pay. In that
sense, the debate is not strictly about state fiscal crises, but state debt
crises, and proposals to resolve them focus on ways in which the states
can restructure these debts in order to avoid the crisis entirely.
This focus on debt is understandable. The collective debts of the
several states are staggering, and states frequently rely on unrealistic
projections of tax and pension fund growth that, during an economic
2
decline, may render the states unable to meet those obligations.
But what if the problem facing the American states is not a
problem of too much debt, but one of too much law? Put differently,
state debt crises might be symptomatic of a deeper crisis whereby the
state fiscal policy-making process is gummed up by statutory and
constitutional restrictions on the use of public resources, such that
combating budgetary shortfalls—whether caused by economic
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Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy symposium on state debt crises,
especially Joseph Blocher, Adam Feibelman, Michael Greve, Gene Nichol, Stephen Sachs, and
Ernest Young. Finally, I am very grateful for the work of and conversations with David Skeel
and the contributors to the book, WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND
SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS. Specific contributions are noted
below.
1. See, for example, David Skeel, State Bankruptcy, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012),
for an overview.
2. See generally Olivia Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN
FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012) [hereinafter WHEN STATES GO
BROKE] (providing an overview of state pension obligations).
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recession, political gridlock, or some combination of the two—
becomes increasingly unlikely. This essay takes a look at that issue:
state fiscal crises and the problem of too much law.
This problem broaches two sequential, but otherwise unrelated,
dynamics: lawmaking by direct democracy on the one hand, and fiscal
federalism and the moral hazard it can create on the other. First, in
the states that allow them, constitutional amendments by direct
democracy—whether by popular initiative or by legislature-approved
referendum—can place unyielding restrictions on the state budgets
that, in times of crisis, may render the state unable to meet its fiscal
demands. Add this dynamic to the frequently dysfunctional fiscal
policy processes so often associated with these same states’
legislatures and the result can be fiscal deadlock and, potentially, fiscal
crisis.
Second, while direct democracy can create other problems for a
polity, the risk of moral hazard that inheres in fiscal federalism can
make direct democracy a problem for those who do not participate in
it. In a federal system such as exists in the United States, state fiscal
crises create moral hazard easily, as states take risks that they hope
the federal government will absorb. If the federal government agrees,
federal taxpayers would thus absorb the losses of state fiscal crises in
a way that, if history is a guide, can distort political conversations
regarding fiscal policy and push the costs of risky behavior to those
who do not enjoy the benefits. The interaction between these
problems—the potential instability of fiscal policy by constitutional
amendment and the risk of moral hazard in a federal system—is an
important and understudied dynamic of state fiscal crises.
This essay is not the first to observe that democracy influences
fiscal crises. The problem is that “voters do not fully understand the
relationship between current deficits and future taxes—they simply
3
reward spending and punish taxation.” As one commentator on the
state of California’s fiscal affairs colorfully put it, the Californian
experience is that its citizens expect to be “taxed like libertarians, but
4
subsidized like socialists.” Add to the paradoxical—but fully
rational—preference for taxes and subsidies the penchant for using
3. JONATHAN RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM 21 (2006) (citing JAMES BUCHANAN & RICHARD WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN
DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977)).
4. Troy Senik, Who Killed California?, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall 2009, at 60, available at
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20091229_Senik_Fall09.pdf.
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laws promulgated via direct democracy to bind the hands of
legislators in the fiscal policy-making arena, and the result may be a
dysfunctional fiscal policy process.
This symposium essay offers a preliminary, counter-intuitive
solution to this unholy confluence of direct democracy, fiscal policy
sclerosis, and federation moral hazard: the use of direct democracy to
combat direct democracy, thereby providing protection to federal
taxpayers exposed to losses by state fiscal crises. Taking a cue from
5
the Financial Review Board system seen in the municipal bankruptcy
context, this essay proposes a state constitutional amendment by
referendum or initiative that dislodges the fiscal policy-making
process from the legislature and referendum-burdened state
constitution. In place of these traditional fiscal policy-making regimes,
6
the referendum would accept the authority of a federally created
commission called the Fiscal Restoration Commission (FRC). The
FRC would then recreate the state’s budgetary laws from the ground
up. The release of federal funds to save a state’s fiscal affairs would be
contingent on the adoption, again by referendum, of the FRC’s
proposals. The result would be a clearing of restrictive law, rather than
the clearing of restrictive debt, the focus of most state restructuring
proposals offered until now.
This essay explains this proposal in detail and assesses several
legal and policy arguments against it. Perhaps befitting a proposal
grounded partially in constitutional law but advanced by a student of
business law and bankruptcy, the arguments are necessarily tenuous
and preliminary. But however preliminary, the problem the proposal
seeks to address is not far-fetched. The interaction of state fiscal crises
and direct democracy is a potentially serious one; the risk of moral
hazard in a federalist system is high; and the present regime is illequipped to resolve the problems, particularly in times of crisis when
the problems are on fullest display.

5. “Financial Review Boards” are also known as “Financial Control Boards.” See, e.g.,
Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 733, 735–45 (1996). For reasons explained below, I prefer “Financial Review Boards.”
Infra note 27.
6. Except where noted, I use the term “referendum” to refer to any mechanism whereby
the populace accepts or rejects changes to state statutory or constitutional law, irrespective of
the origin of such law. As such, the use of the term encompasses both voter-directed initiatives
and legislature-directed referenda. I do so only for concision and euphony. There are key
differences between referenda and initiatives that are relevant to this discussion only where
noted.
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The benefits of the proposal are several. First, it allows the extent
of the states’ fiscal crises to manifest itself fully before a structural
overhaul is needed. As many scholars have noted, the problem of
7
state fiscal crises is political, not economic. In order for the FRC to
be triggered, the political regime already in place must be incapable
of resolving the fiscal problems that its state faces. This mechanism
protects the proposal from being exploited for partisan, rather than
fiscal, ends. The structure proposed here would only come into play
when its citizens determine that the state is actually and squarely
faced with the prospect of defaulting on its debts, whether to its
employees, its citizens, or its bondholders. And because there may
well not be, at present, a connection between direct democracy and
8
fiscal crises, structuring a solution that waits for a problem to
manifest itself does not presume the problem it awaits to resolve.
Second, the proposal allows for a nonpartisan mechanism to
evaluate the many statutory and constitutional restrictions on a state’s
budget and provides the state with a streamlined alternative to its
own budget-making process. And third, it goes deeper than a simple
restructuring, allowing a constitutional amendment to do away with
decades of accumulated, perhaps inconsistent, budgetary restrictions
that can clog a state’s ability to navigate fiscal crises.
The main aim in this essay is to create a space for discussion of the
problem of too much law in the context of state fiscal crises—a
problem the existence of which should be more fully established by
empirical analysis, especially concerning the most recent state debt
crises and their relationship to direct democracy. The FRC proposal
offered here is intended to be strictly nonpartisan: it must offend or
please parties on the left and right alike if it is to be successful. Any
aspect that strays into one corner or another should be criticized and
modified; the entire purpose is to create a mechanism that identifies a
failure of partisan politics and uses nonpartisan decision-making to
overcome that failure. The proposal’s very plausibility, from an
academic perspective, depends on the ability to supersede political
considerations.

7. See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism; Adam J. Levitin,
Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy; Damon A. Silvers, Obligations Without the
Power to Fund Them, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter
Initiatives Paralyzed the California Budget?, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 248, 249–50 (2005).
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The essay proceeds as follows: Part I provides the background of
the problems described above. Part I.A describes the problem of
direct democracy in the context of fiscal crises, using California as an
example. Part I.A also describes the problem of fiscal federalism and
explains how moral hazard can result in this context. Part I.B then
describes the mechanism used to override a similar problem in an
analogous context, namely the establishment of Financial Review
Boards that oversee municipal bankruptcies.
Part II turns to the solution and describes the Fiscal Restoration
Commission, explaining its many components based in state and
federal law, as well as the importance of institutional design in
creating the FRC. Part III addresses the constitutional and policy
counterarguments, while also distinguishing the FRC from the
category of solutions generally referred to as “state bankruptcy,”
which address the related—but distinct—problem of excessive state
debts.
I. THE POPULAR CONTEXT OF FISCAL CRISIS
A. State Fiscal Crises and Direct Democracy in Context
Fiscal crises in the American states are as American as Pop-Tarts.
The presence—and more especially, the threat—of fiscal crises have
been a part of the political discussion since the American states have
existed as cognizable legal entities. This dynamic is unlikely to change.
And yet, as economists Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo and John Wallis have
noted, “[h]ope springs eternal in America, . . . and for close to 200
years, state governments and their citizens have regularly tried to
prevent the next crisis from occurring by changing the constitutional
rules that constrain state government taxing, spending, and
9
borrowing.”
Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis call these efforts “fiscal
10
constitutions.” As Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis describe them, they
11
come in four stripes. The first, and most common, is the
constitutional imposition of procedural requirements that limit the
12
amount or variety of debts that a state can issue. Second are the
9. Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Wallis, Fiscal Constitutions & Fiscal Crises: A
History, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 2, at 9.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 19.
12. Id.
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nearly ubiquitous balanced-budget amendments, never successful at
13
the federal level but wildly popular among the states. Third is a
constitutionally mandated “rainy day fund,” which requires the states
to put away money in good years and then draw on that money in
14
harder times. And fourth are tax and expenditure limits that either
link the fates of tax and expenditure levels or raise procedural
barriers to changing tax or expenditure levels, such as allowing tax
15
increases only through supermajority voting.
There is another class of fiscal constitutions, however, that is the
inverse of the categories Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis identify. This
class contains constitutional amendments mandating that the annual
state budget devote a fixed percentage of resources to a given cause
or activity. The quintessential example is California’s Proposition 98, a
referendum passed in 1988 that requires the state legislature to
devote a fixed amount of the budget to education, subject to different
16
constraints depending on the state’s general economic outlook.
Proposition 22—the Local Taxpayer, Public Safety, and Transportation
17
Act (2010) —is another example, though it is structured differently.
Proposition 22 banned the state from “borrowing” funds raised
primarily from local taxes for any purpose other than local public
safety, emergency response, or other local government services.
However guided or misguided the aims of Proposition 98,
Proposition 22, and other similarly structured popular amendments,
the budgetary restriction is clear. Indeed, such restrictions are the
very point of the proposition: no matter what other competing
budgetary goals, California must, in the example of Proposition 98,

13. Of all the states, only Vermont and Wyoming lack such amendments, and even
Wyoming is “required to balance in practice.” GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAO/AFMD-9358BR, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3 & n.3 (1993), available at http://gao.gov/assets/80/78648.pdf.
14. Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 9, at 19.
15. Id.
16. Cal. Proposition 98: Sch. Funding Initiative Constitutional Amend. and Statute,
reprinted
in
California
Ballot
Pamphlet
79,
127–28
(1988),
available
at
http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1988g.pdf (showing that upon passage of Proposition 98,
during normal economic times forty percent of the state general fund will be spent on
kindergarten through community-college education).
17. Cal. Proposition 22: Prohibits the State From Borrowing or Taking Funds Used for
Transp., Redevelopment, or Local Gov’t Projects and Services. Initiative Constitutional
Amend. 30 (2010), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (showing that
upon passage of Proposition 22, California would be prohibited, even during a period of severe
fiscal hardship, from delaying the distribution of tax revenues for transportation,
redevelopment, or local government projects and services).
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pay as much as forty percent of its annual budget to public education.
Or in the example of Proposition 22, it may not remove local tax
revenues from hotel or sales taxes to fund state services in other areas
18
of the state.
These kinds of specific budgetary restrictions appear to be
relatively rare among California’s constitutional amendments. But
that is not to say that all other instances of direct democracy are
fiscally innocuous. Indeed, many such propositions are costly even
without tying up a fixed percentage of the budget. The annual parade
of propositions that would amend the state constitution may
adversely impact the public fisc in myriad ways, whether that impact is
felt directly on the public resources that must be devoted to fund the
propositions or indirectly through the requirements that compliance
19
imposes on private actors.
Many states that allow for constitutional amendment via popular
referendum specifically require a “fiscal impact statement” to
20
accompany proposed amendments. But fiscal impact statements are
themselves necessarily speculative and substantively incomplete. A
true fiscal impact statement would mention not only the potential cost
of a given proposition, but also the ways in which that cost would
require the elimination or subtraction of other services, an increase in
taxes, or the increased likelihood of fiscal crisis. This is not a criticism
of fiscal impact statements, but simply a recognition that voters at the
ballot box—or, for that matter, legislators in the state capitol—are
rarely best situated to recognize the cost of these amendments.

18. For an entertaining illustration of the phenomenon of California’s popular referendum
and fiscal crisis, see The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: California’s Direct Democracy Troubles
(Comedy Central cable television broadcast Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.thedaily
show.com/watch/mon-december-5-2011/california-s-direct-democracy-troubles.
19. California’s Proposition 65, titled “The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act,” provides a good example here. Initiative Measure, Proposition 65 (approved Nov. 4, 1986)
(codified as amended at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25, 249.5-.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001)),
available at http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/P65law72003.html. Proposition 65 requires
business owners to give a “clear and reasonable warning” of any potential exposure to chemicals
“known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity” to any individual who may be
exposed to such chemicals. Id.
20. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9005 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 295.015
(West 2011); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL
I&R TASK FORCE 27 (2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/
irtaskfc/IandR_report.pdf.
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1. Moral Hazard and Fiscal Federalism
The reason—in many ways, the only reason—that such fiscal
constitutions are the business of anyone other than the state’s citizens
is simple: in a federation, there is a high tendency for moral hazard
based upon the expectation of subnational governmental bailout from
the national government. This tendency is a corollary to the principle
of fiscal federalism, long an aspect of discussion of federalism among
21
economists and political scientists. Jonathan Rodden, the leading
academic analyst of this phenomenon, describes the “dangerous
equilibrium” of moral hazard in federations in these terms:
The central government—because of its role in funding most
provincial-level expenditures—cannot credibly commit to ignore
the fiscal woes of troubled provincial governments, but because of
its political composition, it also cannot cut off their access to
borrowing. In these situations, semi-sovereign provincial
governments can borrow with implicit federal guarantees and
over-fish the common pool of national revenue, ultimately
22
undermining the creditworthiness of the entire public sector.

Rodden describes this equilibrium using formal theory, case studies,
and the reactions of credit-rating agencies to explain exactly how this
implicit guarantee is formed and how individual governments—local
23
and central—react in various circumstances.
Of course, there are a number of different ways in which systems
can federate. The European Union under the Maastricht Treaty, the
United States under the U.S. Constitution, the United States under
the Articles of Confederation, and explicitly trade-centered
federations like the North American Free Trade Agreement are just a
few examples of different types of federations. But in instances where
the federation has expressly or impliedly backstopped the fiscal
affairs of its governmental subunits—regardless of the ties that
connect the federation otherwise—there is the risk that a textbook
example of moral hazard can arise. If the insolvent state has the
promise—through a unified currency, economy, or polity—of support
in time of fiscal distress, the tendency to engage in risky behavior will
increase. The benefits of such behavior redound to individual states,

21. For the original discussions of fiscal federalism, see generally WALLACE OATES,
FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972) and RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959).
22. RODDEN, supra note 3, at vi.
23. Id. at 12, 47, 136.
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the costs to the entire federation. There is ample reason that the
bailouts of the states would either exacerbate this moral hazard or
allow others to perceive such exacerbation and thus cause a
groundswell of support for political change on this question.
The particulars of how and when such moral hazard arises will
vary according to context. Rodden describes one apparently
necessary, though insufficient, condition as where “subnational
governments rely on grants and revenue-sharing rather than
24
independent local taxation.” Thus, the very participation of the
federal government in the state’s provision of governmental services
increases the likelihood of moral hazard, a topic addressed in greater
detail below.
The upshot from Rodden and others’ observations regarding
moral hazard and fiscal federalism is simply that it exists, making the
fiscal problems of subnational governments the potential fiscal
problems of citizens throughout the federation. Thus, resolving these
problems necessarily becomes a concern for the entire national
government, and not simply the subnational government most
directly affected.
B. Financial Review Boards
The fact that states have changed their constitutions in ways that
reflect fiscal rigidity is not an indictment of that process. There is
nothing untoward or irrational about a populace’s interest in lashing
state legislators to the mast in order to guarantee the provision of
certain services in the future. That is the very essence of a Ulysses
contract, which is an accepted view of what constitutional law is and
25
does.
Indeed, such legal precommitments are not ipso facto fiscally
dangerous. The problem is that they can quickly become dangerous,
especially as economic conditions deteriorate. And while the crisis

24. Id. at 12.
25. For more on lawmaking as a Ulysses contract, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (describing the nature
of precommitments generally); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439
(2011) (discussing the weaknesses of law as a precommitment device in the context of private
bailouts); Peter Conti-Brown & Ronald J. Gilson, The Limits of Independence in Institutional
Design (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing precommitments in
institutional design). For a discussion of such precommitment devices in the context of
constitutional law, see Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1631, 1643 (2009).
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among the states may well be overstated, the risk of crisis is
unquestionably exacerbated by the presence of such policies.
In the event that such restrictions prove more than a state could
handle, it would seem reasonable to seek to restore the budgetary
flexibility that such referenda have removed. A potential means of
doing so would be through a legislative veto of some or all such
referenda themselves. But this is an undesirable mechanism for
handling the problem of budgetary inflexibility. The entire point of
legislating—or amending the constitution, as the case may be—by
referendum is that the usual process of representative democracy has
come under question. Allowing legislators to veto the voters would
subvert the very point of direct democracy. Perhaps allowing
legislators to enervate the direct democracy process is a desirable
policy outcome. But if a state’s citizens have become suspicious of the
mechanisms of popular referenda writ large, perhaps a more
reasonable constitutional device would be to remove direct
democracy from the picture entirely, rather than attempt a hybrid
system that, ultimately, removes direct democracy in effect without
doing so in fact. In other words, legislative veto of a popular
referendum is no popular referendum at all.
This essay takes a different tack and would seek that “veto” only
on the condition that a crisis does, in fact, exist. In such an event, the
veto would not reside in the state legislature, but in the hands of an
appointed commission. To understand how that process works, it is
helpful to understand Financial Review Boards, an analogue from
27
municipal bankruptcy.
Financial Review Boards are designed to require a bankrupt
municipality to subject its fiscal affairs to an outside authority,
consisting primarily of delegates of the state government. They are
creatures of the state, in some cases designed on an ad hoc basis as
28
specific state agencies. Financial Review Boards have been used in
26. Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis place the states’ fiscal crisis in historical perspective and
demonstrate that the American states have proven remarkably consistent in paying their debts
as they come due. Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 9, at 11–14.
27. I use the term Financial Review Boards, but the term more often deployed is
“Financial Control Board.” See Financial Control Boards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
D.C. of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight H.R., 104th Cong. 57 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearings]. I prefer “review” in the context of federal-state relations, because of its emphasis on
the nature of the federal power being used.
28. See the case of the Bridgeport Financial Review Board, described more fully in
Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case
Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 630–32 (1995) (describing how
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the context of municipal bankruptcies in at least Connecticut, New
30
31
32
Jersey, New York City, and Philadelphia, but are far from
33
widespread. California, for example, does not appear to use them.
In addition to their relative lack of use, the Boards are something
of a curious beast in the municipal bankruptcy context. Federal law
34
provides for municipal bankruptcy, but the Bankruptcy Code does
not require that such boards be established: where they exist, they are
state entities, not federal ones. From a multilevel governmental
perspective, this is perhaps as it should be. The constitutional
justification for municipal bankruptcy is that municipalities are
corporate entities that are subunits of the states in which they reside
and do not of themselves possess sovereignty of the sort recognized
by the U.S. Constitution. That the sovereigns presiding over these
corporate entities might want to impose a mechanism of
accountability over bankrupt subentities seems plausible, even
desirable. At the very least, the presence of Financial Review Boards
in the municipal bankruptcy context is certainly less controversial
than the idea that the federal government could impose a similar
institution to oversee the fiscal affairs of the sovereign states.
The use of a Financial Review Board in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
is illustrative. In 1988, when local Bridgeport officials refused to deal
with the city’s mounting fiscal distress and maintain the required
35
balanced budget, the Connecticut legislature passed a Special Act
creating the Bridgeport Financial Review Board (the Board) to

the State Assembly of Connecticut created a Financial Review Board to oversee Bridgeport’s
fiscal activities after city officials failed to address the city’s financial crisis).
29. Id. at 630.
30. Anne Marie Vassallo, Solving Camden’s Crisis: Makeover or Takeover?, 33 RUTGERS
L.J. 185, 204 (2001).
31. See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN
FISCAL CRISIS 28–31 (1982) (describing the austerity measures instituted by the Fiscal Control
Board).
32. Hearings, supra note 27, at 57 (statement of Bernard E. Anderson, Former Chairman,
Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority).
33. The (in)famous bankruptcy of Orange County in 1993 did not include a Financial
Review Board. Mark Baldassare’s history of the county’s bankruptcy contains no reference to
either financial review or financial control boards. See generally MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN
GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY (1998).
34. At first, the Supreme Court invalidated this controversial mechanism. Ashton v.
Cameron Cnty. Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1936). In what can truly be called a
“switch in time,” however, the Supreme Court upheld a substantively identical statutory scheme
just two years later. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49–51 (1938).
35. Brown, supra note 28, at 630.
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oversee the city’s fiscal affairs. The Board consisted originally of nine
members, six of whom were either state officials or appointed by state
37
officials. In exchange for state guarantees for Bridgeport’s debt,
which allowed the city to continue to finance its deficits, Bridgeport
38
ceded almost all control over its budget-making process. The city had
to submit its annual budget to the Board, which could determine
39
whether the budget comported with the Special Act’s requirements.
Under certain circumstances, the Board could adopt an alternative
40
budget for the city.
The use of Financial Review Boards will vary with the states that
41
authorize them. The general idea, for the purposes of this essay, is
simply that a group of policy-makers is given the authority to weigh in
on the fiscal processes of a subgovernmental unit. The fact that the
relationship between cities and states is very different from that
between states and federal governments, from the perspective of
constitutional law, will mean that a state Financial Review Board will
look quite different. The next Part explains how.
II. THE FISCAL RESTORATION COMMISSION
Borrowing from the concept of the Financial Review Board, this
essay proposes the creation of a Fiscal Restoration Commission
(FRC). In the proposal that follows, the essay makes three conceptual
assumptions. The first is that there is, in fact, a fiscal crisis that requires
some sort of state budgetary restructuring beyond the conventional,
legislative means of doing so. The essay expresses no opinion on the
accuracy of that assumption. Declining to do so highlights that the
state of the emergency is far from a closed question: agnosticism
regarding a state crisis, in the face of the states’ mounting debts, is to
remain open to the possibility that either states’ debts are not
ultimately excessive, or that the states are already well equipped,
outside the context of a crisis, to deal with those debts without putting

36. Id.
37. Id. at 630–31 (citing Act of June 9, 1988, 1988 Conn. Spec. Acts 88-80 (An Act
Authorizing the Issuance of Bonds by the Town and City of Bridgeport), amended by Act of
June 5, 1989, 1989 Conn. Spec. Acts 89-24; Act of June 27, 1989, 1989 Conn. Spec. Acts 89-47;
Act of June 6, 1990, 1990 Conn. Spec. Acts 90-31; Act of June 10, 1991, 1991 Conn. Spec. Acts
91-40).
38. Id. at 631–32.
39. Id. at 632.
40. Id.
41. For more discussion on this point, see Hearings, supra note 27, at 68–69.
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the burdens on the federal government. This agnosticism is not to say
that state fiscal crises cannot occur, only to say that the crisis may not
have already occurred.
Second, this essay assumes that if such a fiscal crisis does occur, it
will be related to the budgetary rigidity associated with popular
referenda, the difficulty of reaching budgetary compromises in the
face of mandatory supermajority voting requirements, or both. This is
an empirical question that appears to have been addressed only
42
partially, and not since the most recent fiscal crisis. Further
exploration would be a promising vein for future empirical research.
And third, the essay assumes that a failure to resolve a fiscal crisis
in a state within a federation creates a moral hazard, as the federation
is likely to cover the losses of the state, thereby dispersing the costs
and concentrating the benefits of such risk-taking. This assumption
43
appears to be the least contestable of the three.
If these three assumptions are correct today, or plausibly correct
tomorrow, a solution is in order that will allow states to restructure
their liabilities in a way that will reach the cause of the fiscal
problems, rather than merely the symptoms of those problems. The
FRC is such a proposal. This Part explains its features.
A. Federal Statutory Authorization
The FRC would require one federal and two state statutory
triggers. First, with regard to the federal statutory authorization, the
creation of a federal commission charged with recommending
budgetary changes could—in theory—be done by either statute or
executive order. The ill-fated National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform, better known as the Bowles-Simpson
Commission after its co-chairmen, is an example of an executive
44
agency created without congressional authorization.
The
Commission was charged with proposing a dramatic restructuring of
the federal budget; it produced a report but was not embraced.
The FRC should be a creature of Congress and not the Executive
for at least three reasons. First, the FRC’s creation is explicitly linked
to the deployment of federal funds. And while the deployment of

42. See generally Matsusaka, supra note 8 (addressing the restraints imposed by budgetary
referenda).
43. See supra Part I.A.
44. Exec. Order No. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7927–28 (Feb. 18, 2010).
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federal funds has not always been initiated in Congress—for example,
the Federal Reserve’s deployment of funds in the rescue of Bear
45
46
Stearns and AIG, or the Treasury’s use of funds in the bailout of the
47
Mexican peso —a politically controversial move of the magnitude of
a federal bailout of a state will require the accountability associated
with congressional approval.
Second, there is no obvious candidate for already established
bailout funds currently within the reach of the Executive, unless the
American states are deemed systemically important financial
48
institutions for purposes of Dodd-Frank. This, however, seems a
stretch, given the dubious legality of deeming the automakers
49
“financial institutions” for purposes of the Troubled Asset Relief
50
Program, and Dodd-Frank’s further clarification that financial
institutions are only those whose consolidated revenues are
51
primarily—defined as “eighty-five percent”—“financial in nature.”
Whatever a state’s fiscal commitments, such a categorization is facially
absurd.
And third, the FRC can and should be created preemptively, in
anticipation of the first state-level statutory authorization described
above. That is, Congress could legislate in times of non-crisis to create
this infrastructure, which would then be triggered by the passage of
the “fiscal state of emergency” referendum. The latent commission
would then spring into action, with any necessarily contingent
appointments left to the Executive as appropriate. There could be
constitutional concerns if the President creates a commission by
executive fiat that is not pursuant to any kind of legislative
45. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad
Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 717–20 (2009)
(describing how the Federal Reserve worked with other parties, such as J.P. Morgan, to provide
funding to stave off Bear Stearns’ collapse).
46. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943
(2009) (describing the terms of the AIG bailout).
47. Alan Friedman, For Its Loans, Mexico Will Pay A Weighty Price in Sovereignty: The
Rescue of the Peso: A Humbling Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/02/news/02iht-imf.html?scp=14&sq=1995%20mexico&st=cse.
48. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5331(a), 5323 (West 2010) (describing the different kinds of
systemically important financial institutions that the Financial Stability Oversight Council will
regulate).
49. See Cong. Oversight Panel, September Insight Report: The Use of TARP Funds in the
Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry 71–77 (2009), available at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402043042/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop090909-report.pdf (including an exhaustive analysis of that strained interpretation).
50. Troubled Asset Relief Program, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
51. § 201(a)(11)(iii), (iv); §201(b).
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authorization and remains a latent solution to a problem that has, by
its own terms, yet to arise.
The features of the FRC would be formal and structural, and
would focus almost entirely on the ways in which the members are
appointed. None of the features discussed below is sacred, but for the
purposes of comprehensibility, I will describe several features in
detail.
First, because the FRC deals so obviously with highly charged
political issues, it is desirable to create as independent a commission
52
as possible. The important first step would be the appointment of the
FRC’s co-chairs, one from each party. The statute could direct the
President to appoint, by executive order—without the advice or
consent of the Senate, as this would not be a federal officer—the first
co-chair. That appointment would, by necessity, be a member of the
other political party. The presidentially appointed co-chair would then
appoint the other co-chair, a member of the President’s party. The
idea here is that the President will appoint a moderate, independentminded member of the other party. That independent co-chair would
then choose a partner from the other party. The two would then
constitute the entire commission.
The two-person commission is a departure from other models,
such as those used in Financial Review Boards or in other federal
agencies. Such a departure is desirable. The point here is to give the
FRC accountability but also to eliminate, to the extent possible, the
likelihood that it would replicate the political dysfunction of the home
state’s own political structure.
The two co-chairs would then appoint a nonpartisan staff, and the
appointment of each staff member would require the consent of both
co-chairs. That staff should be as technocratic as possible, reflecting
relevant disciplinary expertise (economics, accounting, law, etc.) and
substantive, area-specific expertise (such as the California budget,
California constitutional law, etc.). The benefit of a fully technocratic
staff is not necessarily a vaunted view of technocrats. Rather, this
preference reflects the skeptical view that a more robustly apolitical
process is more likely to yield results that a politicized polity will
respect. The anti-model here is the recent Financial Crisis Inquiry

52. See Conti-Brown & Gilson, supra note 25, for more discussion of the nature of
independence in institutional design.
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Commission (FCIC). The FCIC has largely been deemed a failure.
While some of this criticism draws unnecessarily rosy comparisons to
54
previous commissions, the reality is that the partisan reports that the
FCIC issued enervated its ultimate conclusions. Furthermore, the
appointment of almost all politicians or former high-level political
appointees among the FCIC—many of whom are young enough to
seek to make a political career on the basis of their work at the
FCIC—led to a more divided report than might have been possible
otherwise. By creating a two-headed commission appointed in the
way described, the likelihood of partisan bickering would be low and
accountability high. This would thus increase the likelihood of a
successful, unanimous report.
But there is yet more that can be done, starting with the ways that
the co-chairs—and, importantly, their appointed staff—are
compensated. The FCIC exemplifies the traditional compensation
regime. Section 5(f)(1) of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009, which created the FCIC, provides that “[e]ach member of the
Commission may be compensated at a rate not to exceed the daily
equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at
level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
55
United States Code.” In the FRC, the co-chairs of the commission
and their staff would be compensated also by reference to the
Executive Schedule, but with the following statutory variations:
(2) In the event the Commission fails to file a comprehensive
report in which both co-chairs concur, the compensation for cochairs and staff will be half the rate for level IV of the Executive
Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. In the
event the Commission does file a comprehensive report in which
both co-chairs concur, the compensation for co-chairs and staff will
be twice the rate for level IV of the Executive Schedule under
section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

This statutory variation would encourage a comprehensive,
unanimous report. The reason to link the staff’s compensation to the
53. See, e.g., Tim Fernholz, The Failure of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission—and
of Facts, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 15, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/failure-financial-crisisinquiry-commission-and-facts (arguing that partisanship obstructed the commission from
achieving its primary objective of determining what happened in the crisis).
54. See generally Peter Conti-Brown, The Accidental History of Federal Banking and
Securities Laws: A Review of Michael Perino’s The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand
Pecora’s Investigation of the Great Crash Forever Changed American Finance, 39 SEC. REG.
L.J. 45 (2011) (drawing comparisons to the Pecora Commission).
55. Pub. L. 111-21, § 5(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
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success of the report is to mitigate the risk that wealthy co-chairs
might engage in political grandstanding, since the five- or six-figure
compensation for their work might not be sufficient to discourage
such politicking. If, on the other hand, their entire staff will suffer, the
social incentive hopefully will be sufficient to induce unanimity.
The importance of unanimity is simply to avoid the appearance
that the report, or the process that created it, was a reflection of
partisan politics. The more confidence the public, and especially the
voting public in the relevant state, can have in the FRC, the more
likely its recommendations will be adopted by that public.
One final important point about the federal authorization of the
FRC: it is essential that the creation of the commission be linked to
federal dollars deployed to guarantee state debts, and that the statute
clearly state that no federal funds would be deployed to guarantee
debt without acceptance of the FRC’s report. Query whether such
56
precommitments are actually effective or plausible; the point is not
to eliminate forever the possibility that such a bailout would occur
outside the context of FRC, but to increase the political costs for
doing so. There may be merit to the alternative course, which would
allow the creation of an FRC when a crisis is not directly bearing
down on the state. But I am not convinced that this is the best course.
The idea behind the present proposal is that there must be a fiscal
crisis that the regular political process cannot resolve. Limiting the
establishment of the FRC to respond to actual crises would help
ensure that a request for federal funds will bring with it some federal
power to dictate the terms upon which such funds will be deployed.
In this sense, a federal bailout of an American state subject to the
conditions of an FRC would look more like the private bailouts of
2008 to 2010. Although hugely unpopular, they have almost all been
57
revenue-positive for the U.S. government. The reason, in part, is that
a bailout in this context mostly meant the power to dictate which
assets were bought and sold, which executives could stay or must go,
and other such decisions. In the context of federalism and the
sovereignty of the American states, these kinds of demands are
impossible without a structure that allows the sovereign to accede to
such demands. The FRC—including the state statutory authorization

56. Levitin, supra note 25, at 483–84.
57. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 447–48
(2012), for an overview of this issue.

(9) CONTI-BROWN (DO NOT DELETE)

60

8/20/2012 1:26 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 7:1

and adoption—is that structure and allows the federal government to
place these conditions on the expenditure of its funds.
B. State Statutory and Constitutional Authorizations
There would be two state triggers to the creation of the FRC: one
would precede the creation and the other would accept or reject the
FRC’s proposal. The first would entail a constitutional amendment by
referendum that would read along the following lines:
Section 1. The State of [California] hereby declares a budgetary
emergency, and authorizes the creation of the Fiscal Restoration
Commission, with members appointed as required by federal law.
Section 2. A special referendum shall be scheduled for the first
Tuesday after 30 days following the release of the FRC’s report.
That referendum will read as follows:
“The duly authorized federal Fiscal Restoration Commission
has released its report, which would change [California]
law—including by amending the [California] Constitution.
That report is available at http://www.fiscalrestoration[ca].
gov/fullreport/. The FRC’s full report is accepted in its
entirety, and given the force of statutory and constitutional
law, as specified in that report.”
Section 3. Failure to adopt the FRC’s full report will preclude any
federal governmental assistance to satisfy the exclusive debts of
the state.

Three points are worth highlighting here. First, the state trigger is
done by initiative. The state’s legislature must be deemed, by the
people themselves, to have failed to resolve the budgetary crisis.
Second, the vote to accept or reject the FRC’s report must be
complete. There must be no partial acceptance of the FRC’s report,
unless done so by the state legislature (or through another
referendum, which must occur through the usual means), which would
use the publicly available FRC report as persuasive authority in its
own regular lawmaking. Third, the acceptance of the FRC’s report
must be the necessary prerequisite to the receipt of federal funds to
guarantee the state’s liabilities; this would be acknowledged both by
the state referendum and the federal statute.
The timing of the statute would be as follows: the federal
authorization would allow the federal government to backstop an
individual state’s debts only via the adoption of the FRC, with plenary
authority to propose statutory and constitutional changes where
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necessary. The state would then initiate its “state of fiscal emergency,”
request the deployment of federal funds on its behalf, and commit to
adopting the FRC’s report as a condition of receiving federal funds.
The FRC would produce its report, and a second referendum would
accept or reject it in its entirety.
C. Benefits
The benefits of the FRC model are several. The model allows a
clearing of the cluttered fiscal desk of the state’s budget-making. It
raises the costs of seeking federal funds, thus mitigating the moral
hazard associated with fiscal federalism. And, although I remain
skeptical of the law’s ability to enforce ironclad precommitments, it at
least raises the political cost of reneging on those precommitments.
Perhaps most meaningfully, it allows the problem of too much law,
and any directly related fiscal crises, to become truly ripe. This vitiates
the ability of partisans to create a crisis at the expense of political
opponents. This is not a foregone conclusion. John G. Matsusaka, for
example, has presented evidence consistent with the view that direct
democracy restricts only a third of the state budget and directs funds
to ends that the legislature would already support in the amounts
58
required. Matsusaka’s analysis is important and helpful, and this
proposal is not inconsistent with those findings. By using direct
democracy to address this problem, it waits for a problem to exist.
This is markedly different than a regime imposed on the states
without their initiation.
Moreover, the FRC provides helpful political cover to those state
actors who would advocate for certain fiscally prudent positions
consistent with their values, but feel that they cannot do so without
offending various constituencies. Bernard Anderson—the former
chairman of the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation
Authority, the Financial Control Board set up in 1991 to supervise
Philadelphia’s finances—explained his Board’s successes in this way:
I would say that part of the reason we were successful is that an
oversight board of the type we have gives elected officials the
political cover they need to make unpopular choices and to control
spending. In other words, the oversight board, in effect, is a heat
shield. The mayor [and] members of the city council can make

58. See generally Matsusaka, supra note 8 (demonstrating that voter initiatives took up
only thirty-three percent of California’s spending in 2009–10).
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decisions on spending and blame it on the board because they
don’t have any choice in the matter, and this can be a very useful
device for allowing the city to reduce payrolls, to eliminate
services, to restructure government, to introduce new management
techniques, to renegotiate labor contracts and do all other things
59
that are necessary.

Providing cover to politicians afraid to do their jobs is not normally
considered a virtue in a policy proposal, but in this context, it is
exactly that.
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS
The FRC proposal outlined above is certainly bold, but it is also
sound as a matter of law and policy. Part III explains why, on both
counts.
A. Constitutional Arguments: Sovereignty
Critics may argue that the proposed structure would render a
sovereign state’s entire fiscal structure subject to the plenary veto of
two politicians and their technocratic, bureaucratic staff. It is thus
hardly a badge of respect to the states’ ability to determine their own
futures under principles of federalism. But I think the mechanisms
just described fully respect the sovereignty of the states. The adoption
of the FRC model is entirely voluntary at two stages: the states must
seek the help of the federal government by referendum and then
must accept that help through authorized means of constitutional
amendment. The first referendum must cede the authority to create
wholesale changes to the state’s fiscal laws; the second must then
approve the FRC package without modification. If sovereignty in the
states that rely on direct democracy resides with the people
themselves, then the people themselves can legislate as they please so
long as no other federal constitutional prohibitions are triggered.
To understand the limits of the federalism critique of this
proposal, consider a thought experiment. Suppose Iceland has made a
mess of things and is in dire need of getting its fiscal house in order.
Politicians lack confidence in their own ability to do so, leading them
to seek assistance from their creditors—mostly the English, in various
public and private capacities. To do so, the English impose a set of
conditions that if unmet will preclude assistance. Has Iceland’s

59. Hearings, supra note 27, at 68–69.
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sovereignty been abridged?
60
The answer is obviously no, and the analogy is not hypothetical.
Nor would one find that sovereignty had been abridged in the other
equally applicable analogies of Greece vis-à-vis the European Union
(EU); Argentina vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund (IMF); or
heavily indebted African countries vis-à-vis the World Bank and its
bilateral creditors. Of course, the relationship between California and
the United States is not the same as Iceland and the UK, Greece and
the EU, or Argentina and the IMF, but the analogy between these
sovereign interactions and the ones contemplated by the FRC
proposal is sufficiently apt.
That said, the proposal here would no doubt trigger significant
criticism on these grounds. The nature of federalism in the United
States remains, of course, one of the most widely and hotly argued
topics in both academic and public spheres—consider, for example,
the recent debates over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
61
Act’s Medicaid expansion. Congress has long had the ability to make
conditional federal grants to state governments subject to the limits of
62
63
the Spending Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
64
identified these limits in South Dakota v. Dole. The limits are five:
(1) the condition must be in pursuit of the general welfare of the
United States, a question on which “courts should defer substantially

60. A Parable of Two Debtors: Does Iceland Hold Lessons for Ireland and the Rest of
Troubled Europe?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18557977.
61. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Health Care, Part IV—The Medicaid
Expansion, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/
argument-preview-health-care-part-iv-the-medicaid-expansion/ (describing the “angry public
discourse” over limited government in the healthcare debate).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.”).
63. See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (explaining that
“[w]hile the United States is not concerned with and has no power to regulate local political
activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money
allotments to states shall be disbursed”). For academic discussion of these questions, see
generally Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’ Rights, 574 ANNALS 104 (2001)
(explaining why the Supreme Court will likely reconsider South Dakota v. Dole’s germaneness
test); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse,
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v.
Dole has subverted basic principles of federalism); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal
Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987) (arguing that the conditional
spending power’s invalid intrusion test requires closer scrutiny).
64. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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to the judgment of Congress;” (2) “if Congress desires to condition
66
the States’ receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously;”
(3) the condition must relate “to the federal interest in particular
67
(4) the condition cannot
national projects or programs;”
68
independently violate another constitutional provision; and (5) the
condition cannot be “so coercive as to pass the point at which
69
pressure turns into compulsion.”
The FRC and the associated legislative enactment satisfy the Dole
test, in each case but one, by obvious implication in no need of further
elaboration. The protection of the federal fisc is appropriately within
the “general welfare” of the United States. The entire point of the
70
FRC is to make the condition “unambiguous.” The federal interest in
preventing state bailouts is centrally related to the condition. There is
no obvious alternative provision of the Constitution that the FRC
would violate.
The only potential argument is that conditioning the grant of
federal funds for a state bailout on the acceptance of the FRC’s
report may be sufficiently coercive to render it unconstitutional.
Again, at the time of this essay’s publication, the “coercion” element
of South Dakota v. Dole remains unsettled and will be clarified by the
Supreme Court’s historic consideration of the Obama
Administration’s healthcare law.
At present, though, the element of coercion is not established in
the context of the FRC. To conclude otherwise would be to assert that
the alternative to the federal condition—that the state must resolve
its own fiscal problems, including whatever problems the fiscal
constitutions created via direct democracy—is so unsatisfactory that
the promise of federal money coerces the state’s compliance with the
FRC. This Hobson’s choice argument is unpersuasive, and indeed,

65. Id. at 207.
66. Id. (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. (internal citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 211.
70. The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
for example, tells us that it is designed to “end ‘too big to fail’” and “to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts.” Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C.A § 5301). Section 214 (“Prohibition on Taxpayer Funding”) further guarantees that
“taxpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of any authority under this title.” Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 214(c), 124 Stat. 1518 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A § 5394). There is no
reason, given the political toxicity of the idea of bailouts, that we would expect congressional
statutory drafters to be coy in allowing, preemptively, for congressional bailouts.
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suggests limits to state sovereignty that the Constitution does not
sanction. The coercion argument just described makes the states
passive actors in their own fiscal policy-making. Instead, the FRC
allows for a legitimate choice between two competing restructuring
regimes: either use the tools already available to the state—default,
tax increases, spending decreases, etc.—or use the federal government
as a guarantor subject to the requirements that the state’s fiscal and
legal house be put in order. This essay leaves further elucidation of
these squarely constitutional arguments to constitutional scholars, but
does not concede that the FRC statutory scheme described above
comes close to the line of “coercion,” wherever that line may reside.
Voluntary cession of this kind of authority is not uncontroversial
71
in the context of state bankruptcy, which is also doubly voluntary in
the sense that the state has the authority both to seek bankruptcy
protection and then to propose its new plan itself. But the
voluntariness of the FRC is even more protective of state sovereignty
in two respects. First, in bankruptcy, for example, the state proposes
the reorganization plan, but must abide by the plan’s final
adjudication by federal courts including, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme
Court. Here, the final adjudication is performed by the voting citizens
of the state. Although parties whose interests are harmed by the
legislative or constitutional reorganization that an FRC plan might
entail may have recourse to the federal courts, as would any party
jilted by the exercise of state governmental authority, that judicial
review will be much more limited. The cession of control by the states
in an FRC-style proposal is consequently, at least in the context of
adjudication, less complete than is the case in state bankruptcy. And
in the context of fiscal policy-making, such limited judicial review is
very desirable indeed.
Second, the FRC proposal is more respectful of state sovereignty
by putting the question of federal delegation—to courts in state
bankruptcy, to the FRC in the proposal described above—to the
source of the state sovereignty: the people, not the legislature. If it is
the case that the state fiscal policy apparatus is deeply dysfunctional,
allowing the state to prepare the reorganization plan may create the
same political pressures that put the state in uncertain legal footing in
the first place. This is not necessarily so: again, state bankruptcy seeks

71. Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States: Is It Constitutional?, in
WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 2, at 232–35.
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to address a fundamentally different problem than the one
contemplated in this essay. But to the extent that there is overlap,
state bankruptcy proposals that are initiated through the political
process that created the crisis in the first place may face significant
barriers to their success.
B. Contract Clause
The constitutional concern that has the most traction is that the
Commission’s recommendation would include adjustments to the
state’s contracts that would violate the Contract Clause of the
72
Constitution. This is a concern, especially to the extent that the FRC
must change the contracts already in place, say, with employees or
bondholders.
This is a strong argument: the Contract Clause would
unquestionably restrict the FRC in what it could propose. The reason
that such a flaw is not fatal is that the FRC includes the plenary
power to do anything that is legally enforceable, since it represents a
change of statute and state constitution by referendum. In other
words, if it is possible for the state to change its employment contracts
or default on its bonds outside the context of the FRC, it will be
possible to do so within that context. This is not to say that such
spurned creditors will not have judicial recourse, in the way that any
change in law would similarly provide judicial recourse. This is an
issue that future scholars—and, if this proposal gains any traction,
policy-makers and, eventually, members of the FRC—will have to
analyze more carefully. But the main point is the same: if it is possible
to abridge a contract via statute (in the form of changing prospective
pensions, employee benefits, interest rates, services, etc.), then so too
would it be possible through the FRC.
C. Why is the FRC Better than Bankruptcy?
The leading alternative—and, it seems, almost exclusively
academic—proposal is “state bankruptcy.” This proposal would
73
modify the federal Bankruptcy Code to allow states voluntarily to
file for bankruptcy, which would allow a bankruptcy court to
adjudicate the claims of the states’ various creditors.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”).
73. But see Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2012) (arguing that voluntariness is not necessary).
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The essay has already addressed some of the concerns for state
bankruptcy. But the emphasis on the comparison should be on the
fact that the FRC is a complementary proposal, not a competitive one,
and attempts to solve a fundamentally different problem: state
bankruptcy seeks to resolve the problem of excess debt, and the FRC
seeks to resolve the problem of excess law. But even to the extent that
the two policies overlap, the FRC offers benefits that state bankruptcy
proposals do not. To understand why, it is necessary first to note what
problems the “state bankruptcy” label creates. A chorus of scholars
have challenged its viability and advisability. As Anna Gelpern has
argued, the very concept of state bankruptcy “flips the logical
sequence: it posits an institutional fix for a theoretically undefined
and empirically contested problem. As a result, a debate that should
be filling gaps in public debt theory yields yet another chapter on the
74
uses of bankruptcy.” Moreover, Gelpern argues, “the bankruptcy
label presumptively narrows the inquiry, making creditor collective
action problems and the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution
play host to broader principles of fiscal policy and democratic
75
governance,” leading to a “distort[ed]” policy conversation. Finally,
the bankruptcy label injects the intellectual and political conflicts
of bankruptcy into the world of public debt. “Bailout” and
“cramdown” are fighting words in both worlds, but such overlaps
are misleading. Talking about state debt as “state bankruptcy” sets
the stage for replaying entrenched arguments from a different
field, and threatens to derail a useful exchange for the wrong
76
reasons.

State bankruptcy is thus, at best, a metaphor—and not necessarily an
apt one—for the fiscal crises that states face. As Steven Schwarcz has
put it, “extending municipal bankruptcy law to states . . . can bring in a
77
lot of excess baggage.”
Schwarcz’s own solution would be what he terms a “minimalist”
approach, which is essentially bankruptcy-lite: it places the authority
to approve and finance the state’s restructuring in a “Supervisory
Authority,” but with a more removed role in dictating the terms of the

74. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L.J. 888, 891 (2012).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 891.
77. Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV.
322, 326 (2011).
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renegotiation than would occur in state bankruptcy.
David Skeel, the leading academic proponent of a state
bankruptcy proposal, recognizes the “baggage” that the label brings.
He also critiques “the tendency to envision bankruptcy in monolithic
terms, as a single framework rather than a wide range of possible
79
restructuring mechanisms.” To the extent that state bankruptcy
represents that “wide range,” even the FRC fits within these
proposals. In that sense, the debate over state bankruptcy is better
cast as between those who believe that there should be a model for
debt restructuring of any kind, regardless of the involvement of the
federal government, and those who think there should not. The finer
points of the debate sometimes get lost in the problem of labeling that
both Gelpern and Skeel have identified.
The fact that the FRC proposal and the proposals of Skeel,
Schwarcz, and others who advocate a form of state bankruptcy are
part of the same recognition—that there may be a problem with state
debt that the usual process cannot resolve—partially illustrates why
the FRC proposal is not incompatible with state bankruptcy. But the
complement is more pronounced even than that. Because state
bankruptcy aims to eliminate state debt as opposed to state law, such
proposals would fare better than the FRC at the renegotiation of
specific, retroactive contracts because the FRC likely would be
limited in doing so by the Contract Clause of the Constitution.
The FRC addresses something different, and aims not simply at
the symptoms of fiscal crises, but at their core. If the main problem
with state fiscal crises is a broken system of fiscal constitutions, then
renegotiation of debt will start the states back with the same broken
system that likely will flare up at the next economic downturn.
Perhaps the best solution, then, would be a mechanism like the FRC
(by which laws can be cleared) legislated in tandem with a state
reorganization mechanism (by which debts can be cleared).
In this sense, the FRC proposal follows the suggestion of George
Triantis that a state bankruptcy regime should be initiated by the
80
states and not by the federal government. He argues:

78. See id. at 351 n.153 (allowing the Supervisory Authority to impose conditionality
pursuant to a back-to-back lending structure when funding has been privatized).
79. Skeel, supra note 1, at 3.
80. George Triantis, Bankruptcy for the States and by the States, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE, supra note 2, at 237.
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The state bankruptcy process should be enacted by state
legislation for the following reasons: (1) state circumstances and
political preferences vary, and each state can tailor its bankruptcy
process, (2) the state would internalize the cost of issuing debt
under the bankruptcy regime of its choice and this would reduce
the rent-seeking distortions in the legislative process, and (3)
particularly if combined with federal legislation that is expressly a
default, allowing states to pass their own, this may further
81
minimize the pressures for a federal bailout in the future.

Because the FRC is state-initiated, even if federally approved, it
allows for state tailoring that a top-down model would not.
Essentially, one FRC’s recommendations for California would not be
the same as a different FRC’s recommendations for, say, Colorado.
D. The Federal Government Caused the Crisis
A last critique of the FRC model, or indeed any other model,
would be that the states did not cause their crises: the federal
82
government did. The idea is that the federal government has shifted
the fiscal burden of healthcare, welfare, education, and other services
to the state governments, including through unfunded mandates.
Recall Rodden’s argument that such entanglement of central and
semi-autonomous regional governments in the provision of services
83
leads to a greater likelihood of bailout. In light of that reality, why
should the states be burdened with remaking their laws in order to
accommodate a hostile federal government that created the crisis in
the first place?
To that argument, I have no answer, except to say that a stateinitiated recovery from budgetary restrictions strikes me as more
plausible than a wholesale reversal of the defederalization of
government benefits and services.
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay has made the preliminary case for a Fiscal Restoration
Commission, a federal commission that would dictate, at the state’s
81. Id. at 6.
82. Damon Silvers, Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them: The Origins,
Consequences, and Possible Solution to the Fiscal Crisis of the States, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE, supra note 2, at 1.
83. See Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE, supra note 2, at 143 (claiming that market discipline would be enhanced by efforts to
disentangle obligations of federal and state governments).
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request and subject to the state’s approval, the statutes and
constitutional provisions that have otherwise limited the state’s ability
to put its fiscal house in order. It would be a law-clearing mechanism,
not a debt-clearing one, which represents its main strengths and main
weaknesses in allowing for meaningful resolution of fiscal crises. But
it would also mitigate two real harms commonly discussed in the
debate about the states’ fiscal situations. First, it requires that there
actually be a crisis. As many commentators have observed, fiscal crises
84
are political crises, not economic ones. While there is no question
that the states face enormous pressure and sometimes significant
budget shortfalls, the real question is whether the states have the
political will to resolve these questions in ways that citizens will
respect. In the event that the answer is no, the FRC can provide an
alternative. Second, by making the provision of federal funds
contingent on the adoption of the FRC’s report, the proposal here
significantly lessens—though, almost certainly, does not eliminate—
the likelihood of federal bailouts of individual states, with the
associated skewed incentives and moral hazard that results.

84. E.g., Silvers, supra note 82, at 45; Levitin, supra note 25, at 214.

